Call it a deadline, a horizon, a timeline, a time frame or an "aspirational timetable." Whatever the label, Iraq and the United States finally have agreed on a date by which the United States will have pulled all of its troops out of Iraq: December 2011.

Or not.

Speaking recently to a group of tribal leaders, Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq's prime minister, said, "There is actually an agreement concluded between the two parties over the definite date, which is 2011, to end any foreign presence on Iraqi soil."

Not so fast, said Tony Fratto, a White House spokesman: "These discussions continue, as we have not yet finalized an agreement."

Or, as a U.S. State Department official put it, "Until we have a deal, we don't have a deal."

Thus, yet another irony of the war that never ends: Having brought democratic government, of a sort, to Iraq, the United States might not be able to leave because Iraq's "democracy" is beginning to look like Shiite religious tyranny.

For months, the Bush administration has been negotiating with the Iraqis over a legal document called a "status of forces agreement." The agreement would replace the United Nations mandate, which expires at the end of this year and under which the U.S.-led coalition has operated in Iraq.

Some factions within Maliki's Shiite political coalition want him to demand a firm withdrawal date for U.S. troops, at which point these hardliners probably would move against the country's Sunni minority. The same factions have urged Maliki's government to not allow Sunni fighters to join the Iraqi army or the country's security forces.

Last week, the Maliki government began arresting some leaders of the so-called "Sunni Awakening." They are militiamen who, between 2003 and 2006, sided with al-Qaida against U.S. forces in Iraq, but who switched sides beginning in late 2006 when U.S. forces put them on the payroll. Included are 100,000 "Sons of Iraq," who receive $300 a month from the U.S. military.

The Sunni Awakening arguably has had as much to do with the reduction in violence against U.S. troops in Iraq over the past 18 months as President George W. Bush's troop surge. It even might have had more impact than the surge. The surged troops concentrated on pacifying Baghdad, but in the violent Sunni tribal areas in Anbar and Al Diyalah provinces, it was the Sons of Iraq switching sides that all but dried up support for al-Qaida.

The United States thought it had an agreement with the Maliki government that 20,000 of the Sons of Iraq would be absorbed into the Iraqi security forces. But some elements with the Shiite majority clearly have no intention of allowing that and no intention of sharing political power with the Sunni minority.

Another key issue in the status of forces agreement is whether, between now and the end of 2011, U.S. troops will be subject to Iraqi law or whether they will continue to enjoy immunity. Maliki's government wants to grant immunity only to American soldiers who are conducting military operations or only for crimes committed on U.S. bases.

This argument is a non-starter for the United States, as it should be. The Iraqi justice system does not function independently from the political and religious leadership; it's difficult to see how an accused U.S. soldier possibly could get a fair trial in an Iraqi court. U.S. military courts should maintain jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel.

The United States is not without clout in these negotiations. To the extent that Iraqi military and security forces have gained effectiveness, it's because of U.S. logistical and air support. U.S. negotiators must insist on a full and fair role for all of Iraq's people in the democracy that this country helped them create.

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